Citation: Purvis, S. (2012 
increasing financial muscle of global corporations, constantly seeking new expansion and investment opportunities; emergence of a dominant free market ideology which has emphasised liberalisation and deregulation while opposing state intervention; and a technological convergence of computer, screen and print, driven by digitalisation, leading policy-makers to question the efficacy of any cross or intramedia regulation.
In May 1995 the then Conservative government published proposals on media ownership which argued that 'A free and diverse media are an indispensable part of the democratic process […] . If one voice becomes too powerful, this process is placed in jeopardy and democracy is damaged' (Department of National Heritage 1995: 3).
The proposals called for ownership limits of 20 per cent to be set in the press, TV and radio markets and a regulator would be empowered to restrict concentration above these thresholds where it was deemed that such concentration of media power would be contrary to the public interest. 3 But the response from media groups was hostile. Mr Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation threatened that its British newspaper business, News International, would close one of its newspapers, Today, because it was inflating Murdoch's market share without making any money. The idea of thresholds on individual media markets was dropped, 4 although ironically Today was later closed anyway. 5 The Conservatives were succeeded by a Labour government which in 1995 similarly called for 'a plurality of voices, giving the citizen access to a variety of views'. But it later legislated to relax restrictions on consolidation.
The Labour Party, then in opposition, had also wanted to restrict the share of the newspaper market that any one group could have. This was widely seen as an attempt to limit the influence of Rupert Murdoch's newspapers which had traditionally been hostile to the Labour Party. 6 This most-quoted example of this hostility was after the 1992 election when Britain's best-selling newspaper, The Sun, carried a front page headline 'It's the Sun Wot Won It' claiming that their attacks on the Labour leader, Neil Kinnock, had prevented him winning the election. 7 It became a conventional political -and media industry -wisdom that this was indeed the case. While some academic research suggests that editorial slant can have an impact upon elections, other observers take a more cautious line, arguing that such a conclusion is too simple. Colin Seymour-Ure, for instance, observed, clearly it would be absurd to suggest either that the press has no influence over voters at all, or that it can manipulate them at will. But the range of possible influences […] is so complex that it makes little sense to make such sweeping claims. Even The Sun itself retracted. (1996: 217) 8 Nevertheless, Seymour-Ure also noted, 'How far papers contributed to this volatility and shaped voting intentions remained extremely difficult to establish. Party leaders were probably wise to assume at least some connection, just in case there was one' (217).
Whatever the real power of The Sun, Labour did indeed assume there was some connection between its editorial stance and the result of British elections. Rather than try to limit Murdoch's influence they sought to harness it.
The Blair strategy: 'Manage Murdoch' and empower a regulator
When one of Mr Kinnock's successors, Tony Blair, found time in 1995 to fly to an island off Australia to speak to the senior global management of Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation, a further conventional wisdom was established. 9 This was that because Blair wanted the support of Murdoch's UK newspapers to get elected (he later succeeded on both counts) he was prepared to do deals with him over media policy.
Murdoch's empire, which already had one-third of the newspaper market, had extended into broadcasting and gained management control of the leading pay TV broadcaster, British Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB). Media ownership rules at the time focused on limiting cross-holdings between newspapers and terrestrial television. There were no limits on cross-holdings between newspapers and satellite television operators such as BSkyB.
Blair was asked to look back at this era when, in 2012, he appeared before an inquiry into the press, which had been set up under Lord Justice Leveson in 2011, which became known as 'The Leveson Inquiry' (see below).
Blair admitted that it had been part of his political strategy to get Murdoch's papers 'on board', but said this did not extend to making deals. 'I didn't feel under pressure in relation to commercial interests from the Murdoch people, or indeed anyone else ' (Leveson Inquiry 2012c: 33) . 'Actually, we decided more stuff against the Murdoch interests than we did in favour of it' (Leveson Inquiry 2012c: 32).
But Blair was aware of the power of Murdoch and other newspaper groups to inflict political damage on his party. He therefore sought to 'manage' them. 'I took the decisionand this I'm well aware could be subject to criticism -I took the strategic decision to manage this, not confront it, but the power of it is indisputable' (Leveson Inquiry 2012c: 32).
Part of the strategy of avoiding confrontation appears to have been to avoid a direct collision on media ownership rules. Blair's government published a consultation paper on media ownership rules whose policy rhetoric again emphasized the importance of media plurality to British life. 'Plurality maintains our cultural vitality. A plurality of approaches adds to the breadth and richness of our cultural experience.' 10 But the legislation which followed made no mention of this cultural rationale for controls. There was to be no tightening of media ownership rules, if anything the rules were to be loosened. 11 Blair was open about this when he looked back in 2012:
I decided I was not going to take this issue on […] I had taken the decision we weren't going to do a big inquiry into cross-media ownership. I thought it would be a distraction for the Labour Party coming into office. (Leveson Inquiry 2012c: 43) If that was the 'don't confront' part of the strategy, there were, however, two counter- Cameron was saying about modern compassionate conservatism. (Dispatches 2012) In 2007, after negative press coverage, Cameron's press secretary detected a change of approach. 'I think there was a feeling that if we continued to be rather aloof, to keep our distance, to disregard and not care about our relations with the media, it would be difficult to sustain that' (Dispatches 2012 Election a year and a half later, the Conservatives were the largest party but needed a coalition with the Liberal Democrats to achieve a working majority in Parliament.
The Cameron Strategy Number Two: The regulator is a solution
If winning The Sun's support and the subsequent election success were to be the highpoints of whatever it was that brought Cameron and the Murdochs together in a common policy focus, the next two years, 2010 and 2011, were to witness an extraordinary change of direction.
The cause was a toxic combination of Murdoch's ambition to grow his media business even more and the misdemeanours within one of his British newspapers. And the implications were significant for Ofcom. The regulator that had seemed to be part of a problem now became a part of a solution. Hunt's ability to cite the independence of Ofcom in this process arguably helped save his political career. Hunt also asked Ofcom to take on a role that gave him further future distance from News Corporation. He asked the regulator to 'undertake some work into the feasibility of measuring media plurality across platforms and recommend the best approach'
(Department for Culture Media and Sport 2011).
In Ofcom's response, published nine months later, the phrase 'this is all very difficult' never actually appeared but many technocratic equivalents did . 17 Ofcom suggested a review of plurality every four or five years using a 'basket' of different measures of plurality but with no prohibition of market share. On the issue of what is sufficient plurality, Ofcom was happy to point out that 'Parliament may wish to provide further guidance'.
The net effect of the review was that Ofcom helped the Government put the media plurality issue to bed for a few years. It was perhaps not surprising that the Prime Minister wanted to keep his distance from decisions involving media groups. His former head of communications, Andy Coulson, previously a Murdoch editor, has been charged with perjury.
texted him that 'professionally we are in this together', had been charged with conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.
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A deal or not a deal
In his evidence to the Leveson Inquiry the former Labour Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, alleged that there was a direct connection between the Murdoch agenda, as set out in James
Murdoch's MacTaggart lecture, and what became Conservative policy.
So the BBC licence fee was to be cut, they were to be taken out of much of the work on the Internet, their commercial activities were to be reduced, Ofcom was to be neutered, the listing of sporting occasions was to benefit News International, product placement was to be allowed […] I think what became a problem for us was that on every one of these single issues, the Conservative Party went along with the policy, whereas we were trying to defend what I believe was the public interest. Cameron's evidence to support his allegation of Ofcom being 'roundly attacked' is therefore slim. So why launch such an attack in 2009? My conclusion now is that the four possible explanations which I offered to Ofcom colleagues back then all have some merit.
 It was partly based on his own experiences in commercial television.
 It did provide a headline example for his attack on 'quangos'.
 An attack on a Labour-created quango had particular value. There was a striking change in tone between the 'unaccountable bureaucracy' whose 'remit will be restricted to its narrow technical and enforcement roles ' (2009) 
